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EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE AS LEGAL DAMAGE
44M ENTAL pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does
not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained
of causes that alone." Lord Wensleydale's famous dictum in Lynch
v. Knight1 will serve as a starting point for this discussion. His
lordship's notion of mental pain is evidently that of a "state of
mind" or feeling, hidden in the inner consciousness of the individual; an intangible, evanescent something too elusive for the hardheaded workaday common law to handle. Likewise, in that very
interesting problem regarding recovery for damages sustained
through fright, it is always assumed, tacitly or expressly, that
mere fright, alone, creates no cause of action.2 "The mere temporary emotion of fright not resulting in physical injury is, in contemplation of law, no injury at all, and hence no foundation of an
action," says Professor Throckmorton in his admirable discussion
8
in a recent number of the HARvARD LAw RPviw.

But intimations that all the story has not been heard are to be
found even in the language of judges. Thus Kennedy, J., in Dutieu
v. White, while using, by authority, "mental" and "nervous" as
interchangeable terms, ventures the confession: "I should not be
surprised if the surgeon or the physiologist told us that nervous
shock is or may be in itself an injurious affection of the physical
organism."' It would, I believe, help us in solving legal problems
arising from claims for damages arising through emotional disturbance of a plaintiff brought about by a defendant, if we kept ourselves familiar, in a general way at least, with what medical men
and psychologists are finding out about emotion and its effect on
the human body.
Everyone knows, when he stops to think about it, that being
scared is something more than a purely emotional matter; more
19 H. L. Cas. 577.
2

Ed. 9, § 43 f.; Kalen v. T. H. & I. R. Co.,
K. T. & T. Co. v. Bain, 161 Ky. 44; Wyman v. Leavitt,
17 Me. 227; C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Tinsley, 116 Va. 60o; Memphis St. Ry. Co.
v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637.
3
Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. Rrv. 260, 266.
SEDGWICK ON DAMAGMs,

18 Ind. App.

202;

4 [igoi] 2 K. B. 669, 677.
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than mere "mental pain." With vivid accuracy, Darwin has
described the physical symptoms of fright: 5 "The frightened man at first stands like a statue, motionless and breath-'
less, or crouches down as if instinctively to escape observation. The heart beats quickly and violently so that it palpitates
and knocks against the ribs. * * * That the skin is much affected
under the sense of fear we see in the marvelous and inexplicable
manner in which perspiration immediately exudes from it. * * :::
In connection with the disturbed action of the heart, the breathing
is hurried. The salivary glands act imperfectly. * * * One of the
best marked symptoms is the trembling of all the muscles of the
body, and this is often first seen in the lips. * * * As fear increases
into agony of terror, we behold * * * diversified results. The heart
beats wildly, or may fail to act and faintness ensues; there is a
death-like pallor; the breathing is labored. * * * All the muscles
of the body may become rigid, or may be thrown into convulsive
movements. * * * Great beads of sweat stand on the skin. All the
muscles of the body are relaxed. Utter prostration soon follows,
and the mental powers fail. * * *"

It would almost seem that symptoms of this sort were sufficiently
objective, even for the common law. But in addition to these
external manifestations, the accuracy of which can no doubt be
corroborated by the personal observations and experience of any
one, scientists of the very type mentioned by the learned justice,
physiologist and surgeon, have marked out recently, in the unexciting atmosphere of the laboratory and the hospital, deeper and
more significant effects of strong emotion upon the human organism. Dr. Walter B. Cannon, professor of physiology at Harvard,
and Dr. George W. Crile, professor of surgery at Western Reserve,
and visiting surgeon to Lakeside Hospital, Cleveland, each an eminent authority in his field, have put forth the results of their
researches in non-technical language.6
5
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It is clearly demonstrated that it is impossible to have fear as a
purely emotional thing. "We fear not in our hearts alone, not in
our brains alone, not in our viscera alone-fear influences every
organ and tissue. ' 7 Broadly stated, the effect of fear is to put the
entire power of the body in shape for fight or flight. All bodily
functions which do not directly assist this process are slowed down
or stopped.3 Have we not all seen a scared orator forget his speech?
All functions concerned in the motor reaction are stimulated and
invigorated. Fear, in other words, puts the whole human body on
a war basis. Ordinary peace time industries slacken, emergency
production works overtime."
Dr. Crile believes the phenomena of fear to have a phylogenetic
basis. In the long history of the race, fear was created by trauma,
actual wounding and bloodshed. Nature gradually built up for the
protection of the species a wonderful defensive motor mechanism.
Fear then comes to one as a representation of trauma, and causes
a discharge of the nervous system by the law of phylogenetic association. 10 While our mode of life, our habits, our manners, have
changed, the physical mechanism of the body has not. Tonight's
passenger in the luxurious Pullman car, awakened from slumber by
the hiss of steam, the splitting of timbers and cries of the injured
in a railroad wreck, has the same physical reaction for his fear as
his prehistoric ancestor, battling bare-handed for his very life with
his enemies of the jungle.
The explanation of the origin of these fear phenomena is theory.
Its soundness is not in issue here. The phenomena themselves have
been shown by scientific demonstration to exist. In the large they
have the effect of clearing the decks for action. By omitting description of the patient laboratory methods by which the facts -were
found, the individual phenomena can be briefly but specifically
described.
Fear breaks in upon the digestive processes, directly and quickly.
The flow of saliva is arrested, and the mouth becomes dry; gastric
8

CRmr*, p. 6o.
CRIg, p. 3o. This is not true, the author states, in cases involving

voluntary expenditure of muscular energy, as in the chase.
9 CANNoN, p. 269.
10 CpIn*, pp. 3o, 59, et seq.
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juice secretion stops in the stomach; further down the alimentary
tract, the flow of pancreatic juice and bile is checked.11 Food digestion is not an essential industry in war time, evidently, and the
forces employed in it get no occupational exemption. The plant
closes down with the material on hand (undigested food) unfinished.
Not only are digestive secretions discontinued, but peristaltic action,
that peculiar wormlike wave motion of the organs in the dikestive
process, is suspended as well.12 Involuntary voiding of the contents
of the bladder and digestive tract often accompany the phenomena
just mentioned. 13 Any soldier who has participated in an infantry
attack will give direct evidence on this point. Readers of Kipling
will remember Private Mulvaney's description as he relates the battle of Silver's Theatre. The child-welfare people, in measuring and
testing babies, always prefer to go to the child's home where possible. The emotional disturbance of strange surroundings causes
such increased activity in eliminative functions that the work of the
examiner cannot go on, or at best proceeds with difficulty.
What is true of the digestive tract holds good elsewhere. There
is an inhibition of the functions of all organs and tissues which
consume energy, but which do not make a direct contribution to
motor efficiency-fight or flight.14
Even more striking than this departure from normality in peace
time functions is the effect of fear on those organs which can be
used to help the organism in struggle or escape. Sympathetic discharges, probably aided by adrenal secretion, drive the blood from
the internal organs into the skeletal muscles. 5 This, with the accelerated heart action, insures an abundance of blood supply, and
sweeps away the products of wear and tear which, if allowed to
accumulate, would impair efficiency. Dr. Cannon's experiments
have shown that under the stress of fear the supply of blood sugar
is greatly increased,"8 that the blood itself clots more rapidly, 17 and
that these phenomena are aided by the increased activity of the
11 CANNON, pp. 11-18,
1CANNON, p. 18.

268; CRUX,

13 CANNON, p. 33.

14

CRI,

p. 138.

15 CANNON, pp. 94, 108, 132, 133.

"I CANNON, Ch. V.
17 CANNON, p. 182 et seq.

p. 138.
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adrenal glands responding to the stimulus. Adrenin thus secreted
1s
also restores .the fatigued muscles. The thyroid, another ductless
1
gland, is, in fear, also aroused to increased action.
Fear then is a physical thing. It has been demonstrated as a fact
that in a state of fear we have (to paraphrase Crile) (I) a mobilization of the energy-giving compound of the brain cells, evidenced
2
by an increase of the Nissl substance, " and a later disappearance
of the substance and deterioration of the cells; (II) increased output of adrenin, of thyroid secretion, of glycogen and an increase of
the power of oxidation in the muscles; (III) accelerated circulation
with increased body temperature; (IV) altered
and respiration
21
metabolism.
What is true of fear is true, to a lesser degree, of other emotions.
Fear and anger are very closely akin. And grief, worry, anxiety
also have similar effects, the extent depending, of course, on the
22
length and intensity of the emotion. In fact, it may be broadly
stated that an emotion as a purely merital thing does not exist. It
always has a physical side. Whether it is a wholly physical matter,
or whether the mental state parallels the physical, or whether one
causes the other, need not be fought out here.
Granted all this is true, does it affect our legal problem in any
way? It does show that judicial language formulated, at a time
when no one knew so much about the human organism as we do
now, was inaccurate. But suppose we admit that fear, or grief, or
humiliation is a physical thing, does it thereby become any easier
for the law to handle? The answer is "yes." The question now
becomes a question of hard facts, and the common law prides itself
on dealing with hard facts. The questions of fact now to be
answered are two: (i) does this physical effect of emotion do any
harm to the organism, which we can call legal damage? (2) is there
any way we can estimate it, so that an assessment of money damages, the only remedy we can give, will not be too purely guesswork?
18

CANNON, p. 128-133.
19 CGRL4, p. 133.
20

Elsewhere explained by Cmis as possibly a volatile combination of
certain elements of the brain cells and adrenalin. See p. 202.
21 CRIL,
22 Ca,

p. 138.

p. 139; CANNON, p. 275.
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One must be careful not to be led astray on the first question
Just because we can hear emotional results described in physical
terms in the technical language of the physiologist, it does not follow that they do any material harm to the individual. Dr. Cannon,
by analysis of samples of urine of players on the Harvard football
team, following the Yale game, and that of students after hard
examinations, found the increase in blood sugar following emotion. He did not suggest that the game or the examination hurt
either player or student. Dr. Cannon showed, too, that adrenin
secretion promoted by emotional stimulation will reinvigorate a
muscle as much in five minutes as rest will in the course of an
hour. It would seem then that the tired business man guesses
right when he chooses the excitement of a whirly-girly show, instead
of going home to bed. We might argue that a defendant who has
aroused plaintiff's fears and increased his adrenin supply has done
him a service, has given him more pep, and ought to be thanked
instead of sued.
But harm does result from the emotional state owing to the subject's inability to put strong feeling into action. When nature built
up the elaborate physical reactions accompanying fear, to be scared
meant to fight or run. Now it seldom means either. Yet the bodily
reaction remains unchanged. When fear is followed by the muscular response of a struggle or flight the various products of stimulation are used up. But where the stimulation is not followed by
action, these rich power-giving secretions, sugar, adrenin, and all
the rest, must be eliminated as waste.2 3 The body under the stimulus of fear may be likened to an automobile with the accelerator
pressed down and the throttle opened wide, spark up. The machine
is then in shape for effort to the limit of its capacity. But suppose
the clutch is thrown out, and the machinery left running. The
gasoline is being used up, the machine worn, shaken, and weakened.
The batteries (corresponding to the human brain) will more than
likely be hit first, then one by one the weaker parts are affected.14
If it is a strong machine, the damage will not be instantly noticed
by the casual observer, but it is there just the same. If the machine
23 CRJI, pp. 93, 139.
24 CRILt, pp. 6I, 139-140, I6I.
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has a weak part, (like a man with hardening of the arteries,) the
crash may come at once."
It is then true that the effect of fear is harmful to the human
organism, especially since in modern times it cannot be followed
by action. 26 The effects, in exhausting nervous energy, are the
27
same as those of trauma. Both drain the cup to the dregs. Stated
in scientific physical terms, fear, without resulting activity, leads
to the following definite results: the increase in adrenin may produce arteriosclerosis and cardiovascular disease if the strain is prolonged; the glycogen produced may lead to diabetes. It is said for
instance that "When stocks in New York go down, diabetes goes
up." Nephritis may follow from the elimination strain on the kidneys; increased heart action may cause myocarditis and heart
degeneration. Claudication may also result from impaired circulation. Arresting of the digestive processes causes putrefaction
and autointoxication, and further strain on the organs of elimination. Changes in saliva occur, pyorrhea develops, teeth decay.
Grave's disease may develop from overproduction of thyroid.
Actual changes in brain cells take place-irreparable destruction if
the stimulus is strong enough.
It is then clear that fright as definitely affects the physical organism as does a blow with a club. With no desire or volition on the
part of the individual 28 he may suffer very marked physical effects
as a result of fear, and effects that are very harmful to him. And
what is true of fear is true in kind, though not in degree, of the
lesser emotions such as worry and anxiety.
If the physical effect of strong emotional disturbance is a result
that we can trace and can see, it should be clear that the plaintiff's
right to recover for such disturbance should be recognized. The
measurement of the injury in terms of money is no more difficult
a problem here than in any case of non-pecuniary damage-a broken
leg or a bruised head. The question is simply whether a certain
94.
"The fact that emotion is more injurious to the body than is muscular
action is well known." CRaL=, p. 93.
27 CRnr, pp. 30, 47, et seq., 75.
28 CANNON, p. i85. "The most significant feature of these bodily reactions in pain and in the presence of emotion-provoking objects is that they
are in the nature of reflexes-they are not willed movements."
25 SeeCANNON, p.
26
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act produced a given effect, the same question as in the tracing of
paralysis from a contusion suffered months before in a street car
accident,2" or finding whether tuberculosis developed from an injury
in a railroad wreck.3" The cases which do allow recovery for physical injuries sustained through fright, negligently inflicted, even
withotjt physical impact, seem emphatically right. Indeed, the only
argument to the contrary that has ever seemed worth much, 31 the
practical difficulty of distinguishing between true and false claims,
the danger of fraud through simulated injuries, has been thrown
away by the very courts which set it up. Recovery has been allowed
where there has been physical impact, but it has been frankly said
that where there has been impact the damages recoverable are not
limited to those resulting therefrom. 32 The magic formula "impact"
is pronounced; the door opens to the full joy of a complete recovery. Impact may mean anything, dust in the eyes,3" a forcible seating on the floor. 34 Further, if the defendant's act is intentional, no
impact is necessary, whether the act be one intended to result in
physical battery,35 merely to stir up an emotional response, 6 or a
wrongful entry into another's home.3 7 In such cases there is a difference in the defendant's conduct as contrasted with mere negli29 Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 26.
30 Gray v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 153 Wis. 637.
31These various arguments are set out and discussed in the Throckmorton article cited supra,note 3, and by Professor Bohlen, "Right to Recover
for Injury Resulting from Negligence without Impact," 41 AM. L. REG.
(Old Series 5o), p. I41; see further Professor Drake in ig MICH. L. Rzv.
365, 368. A collection of cases may be found in 3 L. R. A. n. s. 49.
32
Homans v. Boston R. Co., i8o Mass. 456; Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207
Mass. I02.
33 Porter
24

v. D., L. & W. R. Co., 73 N. J. L. 405.

Driscoll v. Gaffey, supra. See comment upon this decision in Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473.
35 Holdorf v. Holdorf, I85 Iowa 838.
S6 Wilkinson v. Downton, [I897]-2 Q. B. 57; Janvier v. Sweeney, [igig]
2 K. B. 316, with comments citing authorities in 33 HARv. L. REv. 324, 68
U. of P. L. Riv. 176, I8 MIcH. L. REv. 332. See cases on recovery for physical suffering sustained by threats on the part of defendant, 5 A. L. R. 1283.
37
Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249; Mollman v. Union Elect. Co., (Mo.
1921) 227 S. W. 265, commented upon in I9 MIcH1. L. REV. 761. Cf. Boyce
v. Greeley Sq. Hotel Co., 228 N. Y. io6, where entry was into plaintiff's
hotel room; commented upon'in 5 CORNZI,. L. Q. 489.
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gence on his part, but where is the difference in the plaintiff's injury
or the danger of simulation? The problem of tracing from cause
to effect, the difficulty of distinguishing true from false, seems
equally present, irrespective of the moral culpability of the defendant.38
There are no doubt numberless instances where a plaintiff's economic interests obscure his perception of the truth regarding injuries
suffered at a defendant's hands. The danger of lying, medical men
have said, is admittedly greater in cases of so-called nervous disorders, because so much of the evidence must necessarily come
from the patient himself, and is not easy of external verification
or repudiation.3 9 This, be it noted, is not a problem peculiar to
damage without impact. It covers the whole field of bodily harms.
Yet no one seems to have advocated a general refusal to permit
recovery for nervous disease because of the difficulty of proving
that a particular plaintiff is lying about his complaint. Skilled
medical men have developed a technique for distinguishing the real
sufferer from the fraudulent imposter. The devices by which this
technique is called into operation for detection of the dishonest are
too elaborate to set out here. On the general question, however, a
statement such as the following from Sir John Collie is in point:
"It should always be remembered that the patient is at a great disadvantage compared with the doctor,-in that he has not the latter's
special knowledge; and if he is lying and endeavoring to make up
symptoms which he thinks suitable to the case, he will produce a
picture so distorted, so lacking in verisimilitude, that its falsity is
manifest. * * * He may often, in fact, be exposed by asking whether
he experiences which might appear to the lay mind as likely to
occur, but which the expert knows are utterly foreign to the ordinary consequences of the accident in question."
"Malingerers are not so foolish as to come for medical examination without having considered beforehand how they shall counterfeit the disease they propose to suffer from. But even so, the inter38 See, however, Dean Pound's discussion in "Interests of Personality,"
28 HARv. L. Rv. 343, 359, et seq.
39 CoLLm, MALNGS1UNo, 104, i29. The writer says, p. 34, that "the difficulties which defendants have in refuting unjust or exaggerated claims are
enormous." He is referring to the general problem of malingering, however.
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view is a contest in which a skilled and experienced investigator is
pitted against an ignorant and crafty rogue, and in the long-run the
issue should be certain."
It is submitted then that whenever a wrongful act by a defendant
creates an emotional disturbance in a plaintiff from which injurious physical consequences can be found as a fact to have resulted,
the right to recover is complete, unless some affirmative defense is
made out. The apprehension that such a doctrine puts innocent
persons at the mercy of the emotionally unstable folk who are the
minority of the community-a fear which has found judicial expression more than once 4 -- should have been soothed by the clear analysis which Professor Bohlen has made of the problem of damage
without impact. 41 Take a hypothetical case. A, in a condition of
partial intoxication which slightly interferes with his locomotion,
meets a woman on the sidewalk. He does nothing. But she becomes
frightened at him, suffers a shock, subsequent miscarriage, nervous
prostration, other ills ad lib. But A is not liable merely because
he has frightened this woman and caused her harm. The element
of culpability is not yet shown to exist.42 Foreseeability of harm
from what one does is the proper test for the existence of negligence, however incorrect it is in determining the limit of liability
for consequences where negligence is proved.4 3 "The jury * * *
must put itself in the defendant's place at the time he acted and
judge of his action by the probable consequences of it. If no harm
were then probable the act does not become negligent because injury
actually follows.

*

*

*44

If the proper emphasis is placed, in

instructing juries, on the requirement that defendant be guilty of
either wrongful intent or negligent conduct, the negligence tested
by what a man of ordinary prudence could have anticipated at the
time the act was done, and if the court will be firm in refusing to
leave to the jury cases where, judged by the standard mentioned,
40 Spade
4141 Am.

v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass.

285.

L. Rwo. (Old Series 5o), pp. 147 et seq., 168. And see POLLOCK ON ToRTs, Ed. 9, 53.
42 This point, kept in mind, would care for some of the cases that labor,
with unnecessary difficulty, on the mental suffering element. See, for instance,
Haas v. Metz, 78 l1. App. 46.
4
3 Smith v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 14.
44 Bohlen, 41 Am. L. R1G. (Old Series 50) i47.

EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

there is no evidence from which negligence could be found, there'
seems slight danger that defendants will be placed at the mercy of
the hysterical, the morbid, or the emotionally unbalanced.
In addition, the negligence must be a violation of duty to this
plaintiff. "Actionable negligence is the failure to discharge a legal
duty to the person injured. ' 45 Presumably the cases denying recovthe safety of another
ery to one suffering injury through fear for
48
ground.
this
on
all,
at
if
justified,
are to be
Striking as the recent work of the physiologist and psychologist
has been, there is a vast deal to be done before the scientist can give
to the law facts enough to settle the questions arising from claims
for what, for want of a better term, we call mental suffering. Every
emotional state, we are told, has its concomitant physical manifestations. With some of the stronger emotions, such as fear, harmMitchell, J, in Akers v. C., etc., R. Co., 58 Minn. 540, 544. And this
would explain Chittick v. Phil. R. T. Co., 224 Pa. 13, where defendant was
negligent, but not to this plaintiff. The principle was misapplied, however,
in Brooker v. Silverthorne, 99 S. E. 350, 5 A. L. R. 1283, where the wrongful
act of the defendant consisted of threats and abuse.
48 Thus in Dulieu v. White, [IgOI] 2 K. B. 669, Kennedy, J., says: "A
has, I conceive, no legal duty not to shock B's nerves by the exhibition of
negligence to C * * *" Ample authority supports the view that if physical
injuries through fear are to be recovered for, the fear must be for one's
own safety. See cases cited, p. 53 Pound's edition of AmEs & SUITH, CAsEs
ON ToRYs. Can we not conceive of situations where A's putting C in danger
might of itself be such negligence to B that B could recover for injuries
from the accompanying shock? The law goes much further than this in
one line of cases, of which Eckert v. L. I. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 5o2, is most frequently cited. (See i BOHLEN'S CASES ON ToRTS 345 for further cases.)
45

C is in danger through A's negligence. B, attempting to rescue C, is injured.
B is allowed recovery against A. The discussion of these cases proceeds
largely on the question of B's contributory negligence. But after that is
settled, there must be found negligence to B, on the part of A, to allow
him damages. We must say, must we not, that it is negligent, as regards B,
carelessly to put C in such a position of danger that B is hurt in the
attempted rescue?
Is it too much to say that it is wrongful conduct to B to put C in danger,
or threaten C with harm, especially if B and C are husband and wife, or
parent and child? There would seem to be something in those cases that
say consequences of fear may be actionable, even where the fear is for
another. See Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210; Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92;
Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249; 3 MINN. L. R v. 539.
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ful physical effects have been demonstrated. Some time we may,
likely shall, have means for detecting the beneficial or harmful
effects of all emotional stimuli. Here we must wait for the scientist. If he can tell us when an emotional stimulus is innocuous or
even beneficial to the organism, and at what stage the stimulation
causes harm, we shall have something definite to go on. But we
are a long way from that now in distance to go, if not in time to
wait. Even with fright, the effects of which have been most intensively studied, there are thousands of instances where the effect of
being moderately scared for a short period of time cannot be measured in a damaged physical organism. Even Dr. Crile would not
attempt to estimate the harm done the body through the fearful
anticipation of an appointed trip to the dentist. So while we
may look with "interest and sympathy," perhaps even with eager
anticipation, for more light from the scientist, the law "must continue to deal with mental suffering as a practical problem of its own.
Without the possibility of proof that a certain unpleasant emotional
experience has resulted in actual physical harm to the individual
who suffered it, is it going to be enough to allow recovery of money
damages that a wrong-doing defendant has disturbed our plaintiff's
peace of mind?
Upon this subject the law today is in that state of affirmation in
one situation, and denial in another not distinguishable from the
first, which shows a change in process of taking place, but not yet
accomplished. We find the supreme court of Georgia declaring that
"Wounding a man's feelings is as much actual damage as breaking
his limbs," 47 the supreme court of Kentucky affirming that a denial
of recovery "would be a reproach to the law."4 Almost simultaneously we find Georgia's picturesque word painter, Mr. Justice Lumpkin, asserting that the law does not protect feelings. "The law
leaves feeling to be helped and vindicated by the tremendous force
of sympathy. * * * The civil law is a practical business system dealing with what is tangible, and does not undertake to redress psychological injuries."4
It would be entirely conceivable to have the law settled that emo4 Head v. Ga. Pac. Ry. Co., 79 Ga. 358.
48

Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 5o6.

49 Chapman v.

Telegraph Co., 88 Ga. 763, 772.
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tional disturbance is too delicate a harm to attempt to cure with the
rough remedy of money damages. How can money measure the
grief caused by the mutilation of the body of a dear one? And,
further, how can a jury tell the extent of fright, humiliation, shame
and other "psychological injuries"?
But the law has not stopped at this point, and in going beyond it
is now in a position which can hardly be logically justified, either
by radical or conservative. That a plaintiff's recovery must be in
money damages need cause us little more difficulty in cases of emotional disturbance than in any other instance of non-pecuniary loss;
the pain of a shattered foot, the loss of reputation from a defamation, the loss of liberty from false imprisonment. A judgment for
0
money is a clumsy device, but it is the best the law has."
Pious incantations about recovery for emotional disturbance
being "too remote, uncertain and difficult of ascertainment"'" lose
their charm9 when we remember how far courts have already gone
in making injured feelings a matter of recovery. In connection
with proved physical injury, wrongfully caused, it has long been
an element in recovery, not merely where undistinguishable from
"physical pain,"'5 2 but in further removed situations, where it takes
53
the form of humiliation for disfigurement, loss of sexual power,"
and the like. It may well be, as Professor Bohlen has suggested,
that the practice of including this element in recoverable damages
arose at a time when courts were not able to force their conceptions
of legal injuries on juries,rr that one reason for continuing to recognize it is that the jury always will include it, whether they should
do so or not.?' The main point here is that the emotional injury is
compensated. Other instances where "mental suffering" is a recoverable item of damages in connection with a cause of action already
recognized at law are frequent and well known. The injury aside
50 See Merrill v. Los Angeles, etc., Co., 158 Cal. 499.
51 St. L., I. M. & So. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 84 Ark. 42.
52 See the Arkansas case in last note; and Head v. Ga. Pac. Ry. Co.,

79 Ga. 358.

G. & M.
441.
Iowa
Co., ioo
5 Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co., 51 W. Va. 132, 68 L. R. A. goi.
55 See article referred to in note 32.
56 Merrill v. Los Angeles, etc., Co., i58 Cal. 499.
53 Merrill v. Los Angeles, etc., Co., i58 Cal. 499; Newbury v.
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from this element need not be substantial. It is sufficient if the
cause of action exists as a peg to hang the parasitic element upon.
Thus the mental injury is assessed in cases of assault,5 7 in malicious
prosecution,"8 in defamation, 5 in wrongful arrest,"0 in seduction,0 '
in unlawful search and seizure, 2 and has even been allowed when
tied up with trespass q. c. f.63 One who is at law entitled to custody of a corpse is entitled to compensation for grief caused by
intentional mutilation, but, according to many authorities, not when
the conduct is merely negligent- (though, pray, why not?) 4 But
no matter how close the relation to the deceased, if the right of
burial is in another, no recovery is to be had. 65 The peg is missing.
There are many more-the telegraph cases, now of little practical
importance since contracts limiting liability have been so authoritatively upheld,"0 breach of promise suits,0 7 even an occasional case
of pure contract. 8 An exhaustive array of all the situations would
serve no good purpose here.
Such an allowance of damages as here described puts an end ta
discussion about impossibility of adjusting compensation, and also
of any talk about the nature of the subject matter being too speculative for the law to recognize as an interest to be protected. It is
protected when we have damage to some other interest hooked up
with it to redress at te same time.
Mr. Street has said :0 "The treatment of any element of damage
as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal
evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasitic will,
57

MVIcKinley v. C. & N. IfT. R. Co., 44 Iowa 314.
18 Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57 Iowa 474.
59
Swift v. Dickerman, 31 Conn. 285.
60 Young v. Gormley, 120 Iowa 372.
61 Hawn v. Banghart, 76 Iowa 683.
62 U. S. F. & G. Co. v. State, (Miss.) 83 So. 61o, commented upon in 6
VA. L. Rrv. 599.
63 Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281.
64 The most recent collection of these decisions may be found in a note,
12 A. L. R.342. See also 28 YA1m L. J.508; 28 HARv. L. Rzv. 322.
65 Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (N. C.) 83 S. E. 12.
66 See citation of authorities, 5 IowA LAW BULL4TIIN 280.
07 Geiger v. Payne, io2 Iowa 58,; Rime v. Rater, io8 Iowa 61.
8
6 Lewis v. Holmes, iog La. 1O3O; Smith v. Leo, 36 N. Y. S. 949.
69 STREET, FOUNDATIONS op LEGAL LIABnITY, 470.
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forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of social, economic, and industrial
needs as those needs are reflected in the organic law."
May we not expect to see, soon, a breaking away from the rule
of thumb requiring emotional disturbance to be coupled with something else before redress is given Fh It is interesting to note the
tendency in other actions than -those for the recovery of money
judgments. Any recent discussion of cruelty as a ground for divorce
shows how far decisions go in considering acts of emotional dis-

turbance as cruelty. 71 There are some recent decisions in the law
of nuisance that are particularly striking. Injunctions against
smells, noises, dangerous storage of explosives, we are long familiar
with. But we find several recent cases where relief has been given
against things whose sole offensive quality was disturbance of the
complainant's peace of mind. Thus a small tuberculosis hospital
was called a nuisance, not because it was a danger to health from
contagion, for it was shown by scientific evidence that there was
no such danger, but because the plaintiff, as a not unduly sensitive
person, feared it." A cancer hospital in Kansas got the same treatment.73 "The question is not whether the establishment of the hospital would place the occupants of the adjacent dwellings in actual
danger of infection, but whether they would have reasonable ground
to fear such a result. * * *" The unpleasantness of the hospital and
the fear it inspires may alone be enough of themselves to make it a
nuisance. Of course these elements are make-weights where there
is noise or smell. 74
One would expect to find undertaking parlors declared a nuisance
70 See an argument for this proposition, 17 MIcH. L. Ri1v. 407.
719 R. C. L. 341 et seq.; i9 C. J. 49 et seq.
72Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47. Cf. Board of Health v. North Amer.
Home, 77 N. 3. Eq. 464, where the court refused to declare a nuisance a
hospital for treatment of tuberculosis of the bone, saying "if no real danger
* * * exists, the mere fact that uninformed people * * * may or probably
will assume such a danger to exist cannot be made the basis for equitable
relief."
73 Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86. Cf., a leper case, Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 Md. 352.
74 Deaconess Home v. Bontjes, 207 Ill.
553; Kestner v. Homeopathic
Hosp., 245 Pa. 326; Barth v. Christian Psychopathic Hosp., i96 Mich. 642.
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if they were a source of contagion to neighbors. But several recent
cases have declared them a nuisance in residence districts, not from
the danger of disease, but because of their effect on the minds of
the people in the neighborhood. Says the Washington court: "It
may be accepted as within the common knowledge of man, that the
immediate presence of these mute reminders of mortality, the hearse,
the chapel, the taking in and carrying out of bodies * * * cannot
help but have a depressing effect upon -the mind * * *,,75
We have, too, many things declared nuisances because they shock
the moral sense of the community-profanity, bawdy houses, public
breeding of animals. Is this not another instance of the law's recognition of undisturbed feelings as a matter for protection?
We need not be duly alarmed that a wider protection to the feelings will open up the flood-gates of litigation to redress all petty
annoyances. The courts will be guided by the same good sense that
aids them in drawing distinctions in the nuisance cases. It is not
every smell, every racket, that constitutes a nuisance. So it would
not be every emotional upset that need constitute the basis for a lawsuit. The sensation of fright is generally a transitory thing; when
without measurable effects, it might be declared too trivial to bother
7
withy.
Mere annoyance is likewise relatively unimportant-indeed,
is not now to be considered, generally, as a parasitic element of
damages. 7" .And so with others. There need be little apprehension
that the older and more conservative members of a conservative
profession, the judges who make up the body of our appellate
courts, will be unduly hasty in extending protection against injured
" Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. r47, 61 Wash. 23o. Accord: Goodrich v. Starrett, (Wash.) 184 Pac. 220, commented upon in 33 HIARv. L. Rlv.
613; Saier v. joy, 198 Mich. 295, commented upon in 4 IoWA LAw BuLL'riN
63. In Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478, 44 N. J. Eq. 297, it was
thought that plaintiff's trouble came from undue sensitiveness. Cemeteries,
however, are not considered nuisances merely because they are "memorials
of death." See cases cited, note 31 L. R. A. (n. s.) 946. Several of these
cases emphasize the attractive arrangement of most cemeteries. The North
Carolina court suggests that "the suggestions thus occasioned would, in the
end, be of salutary influence." Ellison v. Commissioners, 58 N. C. 57.
'16
See the article by Bohlen above referred to.
77 S4DWiCK ON DAMAG1S, Ed. 9,§ 42. But see S. W. Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Riggs, 216 S. W. 4o3, with comment in 68 U. of PA. L. R~v. 367.
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feelings further than principles either of justice or expediency
call for.
While we may expect much help from men of science in supplying us with facts about the nature of man's emotions and its bodily
effects, and perhaps in measuring for us the strength of the various emotions, the legal effect of the facts must ultimately rest on
rules of policy as laid down by courts and legislatures. It is submitted that the law has already recognized the possession of a peaceful mental state as a subject for protection. It now only remains
to break loose from the arbitrary rule requiring such protection to
be coupled with some other claim before affording redress. This
step, it is submitted, we may see taken any time. That is the way
the common law grows.
Iowa City, Iowa
HERBERT F. GOODRICH.

